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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Katherine Stanfield appeals from her judgment of conviction for first-degree 
murder entered following a jury trial. She contends on appeal that the district court 
erred by permitting Dr. Rorke-Adams to give surrogate testimony for the laboratory 
technician who prepared the certain slides, thereby violating Ms. Stanfield's right to 
confront the witnesses against her. Alternatively, Ms. Stanfield argues that Dr. Rorke-
Adams' testimony in this regard was inadmissible hearsay. In either case, she contends 
that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that error was harmless. Ms. Stanfield 
also asserts that the district court failed to properly instruct the jury as to all the 
elements of the crime of felony murder by aggravated battery of a child under twelve. 
Regarding the propriety of Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony, the State argues that the 
doctor was only testifying as to her observations and that the technician made no 
testimonial statements in regard to the samples and tests in this case, and therefore, 
concludes that Ms. Stanfield had no right to cross examine the technician, nor did 
Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony contain hearsay. The State argues, in the alternative, that 
any error in allowing Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony was harmless because several other 
doctors testified as to having reached similar conclusions as Dr. Rorke-Adams. 
The State's argument on the Confrontation Clause relies on an assertion in the 
plurality opinion in Williams v. Illinois,_ U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), which was 
expressly rejected by five justices, and therefore, is not controlling precedent. The 
State's contention that the laboratory technician did not make any assertions upon 
which to be confronted is also directly contrary to precedent. The same is true for the 
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State's arguments on the alternative hearsay argument. In fact, the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 425 (2009), which found virtually 
identical testimony to constitute improper hearsay testimony, is directly on point in this 
case. 
Furthermore, the State's arguments on harmlessness assert that, even without 
the error, the jury still would have found Ms. Stanfield guilty. That approach to the 
harmless error test has been expressly rejected by both the United States and Idaho 
Supreme Courts. Under a proper analysis, it is not possible to find that Dr. Rorke-
Adams' testimony surely did not contribute to the verdict, and therefore, the error was 
not harmless. As such, this Court should vacate Ms. Stanfield's conviction and remand 
the case for a new trial. 
Regarding Ms. Stanfield's claim that the jury was improperly instructed, the State 
relies on the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Carver, 155 Idaho 489 
(2013), which found similar instructions in a similar factual scenario to be appropriate. 
Ms. Stanfield recognizes the Carver decision, but maintains that the instructions in her 
case do not properly instruct the jury. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Stanfield's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by allowing Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify as to the work of 
a laboratory technician in violation of Ms. Stanfield's Sixth Amendment right to 
confront adverse witnesses, or alternatively, by allowing the introduction of 
inadmissible hearsay testimony? 
Did the district court deprive Ms. Stanfield of her constitutional rights to due 
process and a jury trial when it failed to instruct the jury that, before it could find 
her guilty of felony murder by aggravated battery of a child under twelve years of 
age, it was required to find that she had the specific intent to commit the crime of 
aggravated battery and cause great bodily harm to Wyatt? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Allowing Dr. Rorke-Adams To Testify As To The Work Of A 
Laboratory Technician In Violation Of Ms. Stanfield's Sixth Amendment Right To 
Confront Adverse Witnesses. Or Alternatively, By Allowing The Introduction Of 
Inadmissible Hearsay Testimony 
A. Dr. Rorke-Adams' Surrogate Testimony As To The Assertions Of A Laboratory 
Technician Violates The Confrontation Clause 
The State's main contentions in regard to the Confrontation Clause issue are 
that, because the laboratory technician only prepared the slides and did not submit any 
formal reports, he made no assertions in this case, and thus, no confrontation issue 
could arise. (Resp. Br., pp.4-8.) To support this conclusion, the State quotes from the 
United State's Supreme Court's decision in Williams - specifically, the plurality opinion's 
statement that testimony of an expert about the performance of a test by another 
technician is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. (Resp. Br., pp.7-8 (quoting 
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228).) However, only four of the justices endorsed the 
assertion upon which the State relies. See generally Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221. As 
such, even though it is in the opinion which announced the result, that proposition is not 
controlling law. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented 
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those 
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds .... "') 
The reason that Justice Alito's plurality opinion is the lead opinion in Williams is 
that it controls on the ultimate question - whether to affirm or reverse the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Illinois. On that ultimate question, Justice Thomas joined with the 
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plurality opinion, but his conclusion was based on a completely different analysis. He 
entirely rejected the rules and analysis used by the plurality, and thus, no part of the 
plurality opinion can be said to be controlling law. See, e.g., United States v. Duron-
Caldera, 737 F.3d 988, 994 (5th Cir. 2013); State v. Manion, 295 P.3d 270, 279-80 
(Wash. 2013) (explaining why the language quoted by the State in this case is not 
controlling law). As a matter of fact, five justices did agree that such testimony is 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and, as a result, is subject to analysis under 
the Confrontation Clause. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2257 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
judgment); id. at 2269-70 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
In fact, the New Mexico Supreme Court, applying the analysis from the Williams 
dissent, concluded that a forensic pathologists testimony, which related the conclusions 
in a report from another pathologist, violated the defendant's confrontation rights. 
State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 437-43 (2013). The State of New Mexico petitioned 
for certiorari, asserting that the New Mexico Supreme Court's reliance on the Williams 
dissent was improper. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari in New Mexico v. Navarette, 
No. 12-1256, pp.10-20, available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/08/navarette-filed-petition-for-cert.pdf. The United States Supreme Court 
denied that petition. Supreme Court of the United States, Docket Page for New 
Mexico v. Navarette, available at http:/lwww.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName 
=/docketfiles/12-1256.htm. As such, the State's reliance on the plurality opinion is 
wholly misplaced. 
Additionally, its argument that the laboratory technician did not make any 
testimonial assertions is erroneous. Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that the laboratory 
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technician labeled the slides as belonging to Wyatt. (Resp. Br., p.6.) That means when 
the laboratory technician returned the slides to Dr. Rorke-Adams, he necessarily 
asserted that the samples on the slides were from Wyatt. Dr. Rorke-Adams had no 
personal knowledge of that fact, as she was not present when the slides were prepared. 
(See, e.g., Tr., Vo.2, p.1196, Ls.3-9.) However, she did testify as to the fact that the 
samples belonged to Wyatt. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, p.2034, Ls.11-16 ("Q. Could you 
discuss where on Wyatt's body you found axonal injuries? A. The axonal injury was 
present in the spinal cord. And there was one slide that was labeled 'AA," and 
there was seven sections of the spinal cord on that particular slide.").) The laboratory 
technician's assertion was also necessarily offered for the truth of its contents. If the 
samples were not from Wyatt, then Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony about her observations 
of those slides is wholly irrelevant to the case, as it would not make any fact at issue in 
the case against Ms. Stanfield more or less likely to be true. See I.R. 401; 
State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 425 (2009) (holding, under similar a factual 
circumstance, "[i]f [the analyst's] statements were not truthful, [the testifying expert's] 
interpretation of his tests would have been without evidentiary significance"). 
In addition, by returning the slides to Dr. Rorke-Adams, the laboratory technician 
also necessarily asserted that he had performed the tests properly, as required by the 
laboratory's policies. The State relies on the fact that Dr. Rorke-Adams testified about 
the laboratory's routine procedures to claim that Dr. Rorke-Adams could testify that the 
slides in this case were prepared according to those routine procedures. (Resp. 
Br., pp.8-10.) The State's logic presumes that, because there are routine procedures, 
the laboratory technician followed those procedures. However, the United States 
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Supreme Court has rejected such arguments; it has held that, even if the tests were 
conducted pursuant to the standard procedures, the defendant still has a right to 
confront the analyst and "raise before a jury questions concerning [the analyst's] 
proficiency, the care he took in performing his work, and his veracity." 
Bui/coming v. New Mexico,_ U.S._, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 n.7 (2011). 
The State's logic has also been empirically disproved, as laboratory technicians 
across the country have failed, or worse, deliberately circumvented, such procedures. 
(See App. Br., pp.13-14.) The United States Supreme has recognized this fact, noting 
that "[f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation." 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009). As such, it has held that 
one of the purposes of the Confrontation Clause is "to weed out ... the fraudulent 
analyst," Id. at 319-20, and "to expose any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst's part." 
Bui/coming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715. 
In this case, for example, the laboratory technician could have prepared a slide 
with a sample from a source other than Wyatt, but dyed the sample properly, and 
provided that slide to Dr. Rorke-Adams while asserting that the slide was properly 
prepared. In that situation, Dr. Rorke-Adams could only say, as she did in this case, 
that the sample appears to have been prepared in accordance with the routine 
procedures. 1 That assertion would be factually wrong and any testimony about what 
Dr. Rorke-Adams concluded from examining the slide would be of no relevance in the 
1 Dr. Rorke-Adams is not competent to testify that the slides were prepared correctly, as 
she is not competent to testify as to behavior which she, herself, did not witness. See, 
e.g., Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10 (1972) ("To be competent to testify, a witness must 
have the ability to perceive ... the occurrences involved.") 
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case, but no amount of cross examination would be able to uncover that error. Only the 
technician would be able to testify as to the veracity and accuracy of his performance of 
the tests. Thus, in that scenario, Ms. Stanfield would not have been afforded a 
meaningful opportunity to cross examine the witnesses against her. And that is why the 
United States Supreme Court has expressly held that "surrogate testimony of that order 
does not meet the constitutional requirement." Bui/coming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
The State attempts to distinguish Melendez-Diaz on the idea that no formalized 
reports are at issue, as they were in Melendez-Diaz. (Resp. Br., p.7.) The State's 
argument in this regard seems to invoke Justice Thomas's "indicia of solemnity" test for 
analyzing whether an assertion is testimonial (i.e., the laboratory technician did not 
make a formalized statement, so there is no right to cross examine the tecnhician). 
Compare, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (initial articulation of a potential indicia of 
solemnity test). Such a test has never been endorsed by any of the other justices, 
much less adopted by a majority, of the Supreme Court. Nor can such a rule be 
sensibly applied. Under Justice Thomas' preferred standard, a sworn affidavit made 
under the penalty of perjury would be subject to cross examination, but an off-the-cuff 
remark, made when no penalty for untruthfulness would apply, would not. Such a result 
would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Confrontation Clause, which is to prevent 
the prosecution of defendants by use of out-of-court statements without affording the 
defendant the opportunity to cross examine the declarants of those statements. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51. That rule applies regardless of the media in which they 
are presented. See id. at 44 (discussing the use of two testimonial statements in the 
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trial of Sir Walter Raleigh testimony given to an investigating tribunal and statements 
written in a letter - in order to explain the breadth of the protections afforded by the 
Sixth Amendment). 
Similarly, State attempts to distinguish Bui/coming on the idea that the person 
who authored the final report in this case was called to testify. (Resp. Br., p.7.) That 
assertion misreads the Bui/coming opinion. The Bui/coming Court was focused on 
whether the declarant of the out-of-court statements being used against the defendant 
was subject to cross examination, not whether the author of the report was subjected to 
cross examination.2 In that case, as here, the declarant was not subjected to cross 
examination, and therefore, the defendants were deprived of their constitutional right to 
confront the witnesses against them. 
Specifically, the Bui/coming Court considered whether one laboratory 
technician, Razatos was properly allowed to give surrogate testimony for another, 
Caylor. Bui/coming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714. The Supreme Court was concerned because 
Caylor, the author of the report at issue, had "certified that he received Bullcoming's 
blood sample intact with the seal unbroken, that he checked to make sure that the 
forensic report number and the sample number 'correspond[ed],' and that he performed 
on Bullcoming's sample a particular test, adhering to a precise protocol."3 Id. Razatos, 
the testifying witness, "had neither observed nor reviewed Gaylor's analysis." Id. at 
2 In Bui/coming, the declarant of the out-of-court statements and the author of the report 
were the same person. 
3 This list of Gaylor's activities includes virtually all of the same activities undertaken by 
the laboratory technician in the present case. Therefore, if the failure to provide the 
defendant in Bui/coming with the opportunity to cross examine Caylor violated the 
Confrontation Clause, the failure to provide Ms. Stanfield with the opportunity to cross 
examine the laboratory technician in this case also violates the Confrontation Clause. 
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2712. The Supreme Court concluded that "surrogate testimony of the kind Razatos was 
equipped to give could not convey what Caylor knew or observed about the events his 
certification concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process he employed." Id. at 
2715. Thus, the question is not whether the author of the report was called to testify, as 
the State contends, but whether the declarant of the statement being used against the 
defendant was called to testify. See id.; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
59 (2004) ("Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers' understanding: 
Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where 
the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity 
to cross examine.") (emphasis added). In Bui/coming, Caylor was the declarant of the 
testimonial statements being used against the defendant, and so, the defendant had the 
right to cross examine Caylor. Id. 
In this case, the non-testifying laboratory technician is the declarant of the 
testimonial statements being used against Ms. Stanfield. The laboratory technician in 
this case, like Caylor in Bui/coming, necessarily asserted that he adhered to the proper 
protocols in preparing and labeling the slides in this case. Therefore, since the 
laboratory technician was the declarant, Ms. Stanfield had a right to cross examine the 
laboratory technician. See id. 
The only difference between Bui/coming and this case is the degree of formality 
in the declarants' statements - Gaylor's certified report, as opposed to the statements 
made by the laboratory technician to Dr. Rorke-Adams. However, as discussed supra, 
the degree of formality does not govern whether the out-of-court statements are 
testimonial. Since the laboratory technician's assertions in this case were made with 
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the primary purpose of proving a fact for a subsequent prosecution, they are testimonial 
and thus, inadmissible without the opportunity for confrontation. 
Because Ms. Stanfield was not permitted to cross examine the laboratory 
technician, she was deprived of her rights under the Confrontation Clause. 
B. Dr. Rorke-Adams' Testimony Contained Inadmissible Hearsay 
The State's argument in regard to the hearsay issue is simply that "Dr. Rorke-
Adams testified as to her observations and her conclusions which she derived from her 
examination of W.F.'s brain tissue. That is not hearsay." (Resp. Br., p.8 (emphasis in 
original).) The State continues to rely on the assertion of the Williams plurality - that 
such statements are not offered for their truth. (Resp. Br., p.10.) Aside from the fact 
that five justices decided precisely the opposite, the Idaho Supreme Court has also 
held, while reviewing a virtually-identical fact pattern, that such statements are made for 
the truth of the matter asserted. See Watkins, 148 Idaho at 426-27. 
Furthermore, the State does not articulate which of the hearsay rules it is relying 
on for this premise. It seems to contend that, because Dr. Rorke-Adams is only 
testifying as to what she saw in the slides, she has personal knowledge that the 
contents of the slides came from Wyatt. That is not the case, since she was not present 
when the slides were prepared. (Tr., Vol.2, p.1996, Ls.3-9.) Therefore, she has no 
personal knowledge as to the preparation of those slides; she was necessarily relying 
on the out-of-court statements made by the non-testifying analyst. Compare Watkins, 
148 Idaho at 425 (pointing out that the testimony at issue in that case was meant to 
relay the non-testifying analyst's statements for the truth of the matter asserted, and 
thus, contained inadmissible hearsay evidence). 
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Rather, the State's argument appears to be based I.RE. 703, which allows for an 
expert to rely upon facts or data not otherwise admissible to form his or her expert 
opinions if that is the sort of information upon which experts in that field traditionally rely. 
In Watkins, the Idaho Supreme Court pointed out that I.RE. 703 was amended in 2002 
to expressly forbid the type of testimony at issue here: 
The amendment to I.RE. 703 serves to prevent an expert witness from 
serving as a conduit for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible 
evidence. In the present case, the district court did not make a finding that 
Channell's [the non-testifying analyst] statements and notes were admitted 
for the limited purpose of evaluating Dr. Finis' opinion [the doctor who 
authored the final report and who gave testimony]. Further, it is evident 
that the testimony was not offered for this limited purpose. Rather, the 
State clearly relied upon the hearsay evidence for the purpose of 
demonstrating chain of custody, Channell's testing methodology, and to 
identify the locations [where on the evidence tested DNA was] found. 
Aside from Dr. Finis' testimony, no other evidence on these subjects was 
introduced. Accordingly, we conclude that Dr. Finis' testimony as to 
hearsay received from Channell was not admissible pursuant to I.RE. 
703. 
Id. at 426-27. 
Dr. Rorke-Adams offered essentially the same sort of testimony Dr. Finis offered 
in Watkins: Dr. Rorke-Adams testified about the laboratory technician's handling of the 
evidence (i.e., labeling of it), as well as his testing methodology (i.e., that he followed 
the established routine procedures in preparing the slides). The district court did not 
make a finding that those assertions were admitted for the limited purpose of evaluating 
Dr. Rorke-Adams' opinion. (See generally Tr.) Further, the State clearly relied on 
the out-of-court statements: "You heard from Lucy Rorke-Adams, a forensic 
neuropathologist ... She created slides, and she looked closely at what was going on in 
Wyatt's brain .... She also told you about the process that was called beta amyloid 
staining where she can see axonal injury." (Tr., Vol.3, p.4394, Ls.17-24; Tr., Vol.3, 
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p.4395, Ls.13-15.) Aside from Dr. Rorke-Adams, no witness offered testimony about 
the contents of the slides or the evidence of axonal injury. (See generally Tr.) 
Therefore, just as in Watkins, Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony included inadmissible 
hearsay. 
The State also attempts to argue that Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony about the 
laboratory's routine was acceptable pursuant to I.R.E. 406, and as such, was not 
hearsay. The State's argument is misplaced for several reasons. First, I.R. 406 is a 
specialized rule of relevancy, not an exception to the hearsay rule. Compare I.R.E. 
803-04 (articulating the exceptions to Idaho's hearsay rule). Idaho's rule against 
hearsay makes an otherwise relevant statement inadmissible if it is "a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R. 801(c). Therefore, even if 
I.R.E. 406 makes the testimony about the laboratory's practices relevant, it does not 
make Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony about the laboratory technician's assertions 
admissible under the hearsay rules. 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court's discussion in Bui/coming 
demonstrates that the existence of standard procedures is not relevant when the 
question is what a non-testifying laboratory technician did with the evidence and there is 
no testimony to show that the technician followed the standard procedures: 
We do not question that analyst Caylor, in common with other analysts 
employed by SLD, likely would not recall a particular test, given the 
number of tests each analyst conducts and the standard procedure 
followed in testing. Even so, Cay/or's testimony under oath would have 
enabled Bu/lcoming's counsel to raise before a jury questions concerning 
Cay/or's proficiency, the care he took in performing his work, and his 
veracity. 
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Bui/coming, 131 S. Ct. 2715 n.7 (emphasis added). The Court clarified that, even if 
Caylor were presumed to have followed a standard procedure in the testing, the 
defendant is still prejudiced by the lack of an opportunity to cross examine him. See id. 
Whether or not the laboratory technician followed the standard procedures is a question 
of fact of the jury to decide. While testimony about the standard operating procedures is 
relevant, making that fact more likely true, see I.RE. 406, that rule does not allow 
Dr. Rorke-Adams to offer hearsay testimony to that fact. Therefore, whether there were 
standard procedures is not a reason to allow the surrogate testimony offered in this 
case.4 
Given that proper interpretation of the evidentiary rules, it is not surprising that 
the Idaho Supreme Court did not allow testimony of a similar nature to survive the 
prohibition against hearsay evidence, even though the laboratory testing in question 
certainly appeared to be routine in Watkins: "i.e., that Channell received the box, put it 
into a vault, and later opened it and removed the sexual assault kit containing the six-
year-old girl's DNA sample," and that Channell tested the evidence for DNA of the 
alleged victim and perpetrator.5 Watkins, 148 Idaho at 423. As such, Dr. Rorke-Adams' 
4 As discussed in the Appellant's Brief, the existence of standard operating procedures 
does not ensure that laboratory technicians follow them on any particular occasion. 
See, e.g., Deborah Becker, "Examining The 'Red Flags' In A Massachusetts Crime Lab 
Scandal," NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, (November 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.npr.org/2013/11/23/246591027/examining-the-red-flags-in-a-massachusetts-
crime-lab-scandal (reporting that a laboratory technician pied guilty to numerous 
charges of falsifying evidence and improper testing of evidence, despite the fact that the 
laboratory operated under nationally established recommendations for testing of drug 
evidence"). 
5 Besides receiving and storing the evidence, Mr. Channell also collected samples from 
the evidence and performed DNA analysis on those samples. See generally Watkins, 
148 Idaho 423-27. 
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similar testimony as to the routines or procedures of the laboratory technician in this 
case should have also been excluded as improper hearsay testimony. 
C. The State Has Failed To Meet Its Burden To prove That The Error In This Case 
Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
The State contends that, because numerous other witnesses testified about the 
injuries Wyatt suffered, any error in allowing Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify as to the 
laboratory technician's out-of-court statements, which underlay her ultimate opinion that 
Wyatt brain displayed axonal injury and thus, his injuries were not accidental, was 
harmless. That argument is erroneous in that it is based on a misapplication of the 
harmless error test. The State advocates the appellate court sit as a thirteenth juror and 
weigh the remaining evidence presented by the State's witnesses to conclude that the 
jury would have convicted Ms. Stanfield without the erroneous admission of Dr. Rorke-
Adams' testimony. The State does not make any assertions as to whether the error 
surely did not contribute to the verdict. Because the State has not met its burden to 
prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the correct standard, this 
case should be remanded for a new trial. 
Idaho applies the two-part harmless error test established in 
Chapmanv.Cafifornia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 11 (2013). 
Under this test, "the defendant must establish the existence of an error, 'at which point 
the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt."' Id. (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010)). To meet 
that burden, the State must "prove[ ] 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
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complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 
(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24)); see also Joy, 155 Idaho at 11 (same). 
In interpreting Chapman, the United States Supreme Court has explained that: 
To say that an error did not "contribute" to the ensuing verdict is not, of 
course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that feature of the trial 
later held to have been erroneous .... To say that an error did not 
contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation 
to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as 
revealed in the record. 
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n.4 (1991). "Thus, an appellate court's inquiry 'is 
not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have 
been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict rendered in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error."' Joy, 155 Idaho at 11 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 
U.S. 275, 279 (1993)) (emphasis in original). 
Despite those holdings from both the Idaho and United States Supreme Courts, 
the State argues that, "with or without Dr. Rorke-Adams' explanation of what she saw 
on the slides, the jury would have reached the inevitable conclusion, based on the 
voluminous evidence presented in this case, that W.F. suffered an abusive, non-
accidental head trauma," and therefore, the error was harmless.6 (Resp. Br., p.15.) 
6 The State also contends that Ms. Stanfield ignored the testimony of the other doctors 
in her opening brief. (Resp. Br., p.12.) That is untrue, given that Ms. Stanfield 
specifically pointed out that Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony was "repetitive of the testimony 
of those other doctors .... As such, her testimony, absent those aspects about the 
slides, which should have been barred by the Confrontation Clause and the Rules of 
Evidence barring hearsay, would have been nothing more than cumulative testimony. 
See I.RE. 403." (App. Br., p.19 n.6.) Ms. Stanfield did not go further in her discussion 
of that other testimony because it was not necessary to the question of harmlessness; 
the question is whether Dr. Rorke-Adams' erroneous testimony surely did not contribute 
to the verdict, and Ms. Stanfield contended that it did. (App. Br., pp.18-20.) Based on 
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That argument essentially asks this Court to sit as a thirteenth juror and reweigh the 
evidence, and thereby conclude that a guilty verdict surely would have been rendered 
absent the error, rather than evaluate whether the guilty verdict in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error. Compare Joy, 155 Idaho at 11; Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279. 
Since that argument has been expressly rejected by both the Idaho and United States 
Supreme Courts, this Court should reject it in this case. 
Properly applying the Chapman harmless error test, it is not possible to say that 
this evidence was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered, and 
therefore, it is not possible to conclude that the guilty verdict in this case was surely 
unattributable to the verdict. Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that the stains applied to the 
samples on those slides would help her to identify damage to the axons, and that the 
nature of the axonal injury would show what type of forces were involved in the incident. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.2023, L.4 - p.2024, L.21.) She also testified that the slides demonstrated 
that Wyatt had suffered axonal injuries, 7 which proved that his injuries resulted from 
severe linear, rotating, angular forces, akin to whiplash. (Tr., Vol.2, p.2023, 
L.4 - p.2026, L.9.) She provided the scientific proof that contradicted the defense's 
theory of the case. As such, it cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony did not contribute to this verdict. 
that analysis, she argued that the State would be unable to demonstrate that the error 
was harmless. (App. Br., pp.18-20.) At any rate, there was no burden on Ms. Stanfield 
to establish prejudice in her opening brief. The burden in this regard is on the State. 
7 Her conclusion that these slides demonstrated Wyatt had suffered from these injuries 
is premised entirely on the laboratory technician's assertions - his labeling of the slides 
and his preparation of the samples - and thereby, his assertions that the samples on 
the slides belonged to Wyatt. 
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Furthermore, Dr. Rorke-Adams's testimony provided scientific proof supporting 
the conclusions of many of the State's other witnesses. However, there was a 
substantial amount of testimony offered by medical experts directly criticizing the 
conclusions offered by the State's witnesses. For example, pediatric neuroradiologist 
Patrick Barnes testified that there was a growing body of evidence that demonstrated 
the constellation of symptoms on which many of the State's experts were basing their 
conclusions could also be produced by accidentally-encountered forces, meaning the 
State's experts' conclusion were not scientifically accurate. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, 
p.2288, Ls.14-24.) As another example, ophthalmologist David Mark testified that there 
were too many potential alternatives for the hemorrhaging to appropriately reach the 
"black and white" conclusion Dr. Crawford did. (Tr., Vol.2, p.2483, Ls.5-12.) Pediatric 
intensivist and anesthesiologist Gregory Hammer also offered testimony and evidence 
criticizing the conclusions reached by the State's experts. (See generally Tr., Vol.2, 
pp.3069-3236.) In that situation, where there is a battle of experts ensuing, it is difficult 
to see how Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony did not contribute to the jury's decision to 
believe the one set of medical experts, and therefore, convict Ms. Stanfield. In fact, 
given that the jury deliberated for nearly fourteen hours (see R., pp.669-70), the record 
demonstrates that the evidence was not overwhelming.8 Therefore, it is not possible to 
say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony did not contribute to 
the verdict. 
8 It is interesting that the State argues there was overwhelming evidence based only on 
the testimony offered by the State's witnesses. ( See Resp. Br., pp.11-15.) Given the 
substantial expert testimony offered in contradiction of the State's witnesses' testimony 
and the amount of discussion the jury undertook, it is disingenuous to say that the 
evidence in this case was "overwhelming." 
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Therefore, since Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony helped convince the jury that 
Wyatt's injuries were non-accidental, the State has failed to show her testimony 
surely did not contribute to the guilty verdict. Therefore, regardless of how many other 
experts testified as to similar conclusions, the State has failed to prove that the 
erroneous decision to allow Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. As such, this case should be remanded for a new trial. 
11. 
The District Court Deprived Ms. Stanfield Of Her Constitutional Rights To Due Process 
And A Jury Trial \/\/hen It Failed To Instruct The Jury That, Before It Could Find Her 
Guilty Of Felony Murder Bv Aggravated Battery Of A Child Under Twelve Years Of Age, 
It Was Required To Find That She Had The Specific Intent To Commit The Crime Of 
Aggravated Battery And Cause Great Bodily Harm To Wyatt 
Ms. Stanfield acknowledges the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Carver, 155 
Idaho 489, in which the Court upheld the validity of similar jury instructions as they 
related to a similar fact pattern. Nevertheless, mindful of the Carver decision, 
Ms. Stanfield maintains that her conviction must be vacated because the jury was not 
properly instructed on all the elements of the offense. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Stanfield respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of 
conviction and remand her case for a new trial at which she is allowed to confront the 
witnesses against her and at which the State is required to prove all the elements of 
felony murder. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I 
State Appellate Public Defender 
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